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NEW LIFE FOR THE DEATH TAX DEBATE 
ELIZABETH R. CARTER† 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the ascendancy of wealth redistribution as the 
policy underpinning the federal estate tax through the lens of sociology 
and argues that by attempting to ensure equal access to the American 
dream by penalizing only those who have fulfilled its promise, the feder-
al estate tax places fundamental American values in irreconcilable con-
flict. The reason that the current system does not work, I argue, is rooted 
more in history and sociology than it is in economics. The solution is not 
necessarily the repeal of the federal estate tax. Nor is the solution replac-
ing the estate tax with an inheritance tax, an accessions tax, or taxing 
inheritances as income, as proposed by other commentators. The estate 
tax plays, or should play, an important role in ensuring vertical and hori-
zontal equity in our federal tax system. Perhaps more importantly, it also 
has the potential to provide a safety net of revenue during times of exi-
gency, such as that currently faced by our nation. In order to achieve 
these goals, however, we must first correctly recognize the fundamental 
problem with the current system. When the history of the tax is examined 
from a sociological and historical vantage point, the real problem be-
comes clear.  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 178 
II. SOCIOLOGY AND CORE AMERICAN VALUES .................................... 179 
A. Sociological Values ..................................................................... 179 
B. Values and Political Attitudes ..................................................... 181 
III. TAXING DEATH ............................................................................... 183 
A. Tax the Receipt of Property ......................................................... 184 
1. Income Tax Approach ............................................................ 184 
2. Inheritance Tax Approach ...................................................... 186 
B. Tax the Transfer of Property ....................................................... 186 
IV. TAX POLICY AND THE NATURE OF POLICY DEBATES ..................... 187 
A. Typical Policy Debate: Home-Mortgage Interest Deduction ..... 187 
B. Atypical Policy Debate: The Federal Estate Tax ........................ 189 
  
 † Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. LL.M. in Taxation, University of 
Alabama; J.D., Tulane University School of Law; B.S., University of Memphis; B.A., University of 
Memphis. The author thanks S. Frazer Rankin, Mark Mintz, and Jennifer Kitner for inspiring this 
Article. The author also thanks her research assistants, Kathrryn Theriot Trew and Edward Waters 
for their invaluable assistance.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2033176
File: Issue1_Carter_FINAL_ToDarby_021913 Created on: 2/19/2013 10:33:00 PM Last Printed: 2/19/2013 10:33:00 PM 
176 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1 
V. VIEWING THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX THROUGH A 
SOCIOLOGY LENS ............................................................................. 192 
A. Revolutionary Core American Values and Politics ..................... 192 
B. Early American Inheritance Law and Policy .............................. 194 
C. Early Federal Death Taxes ......................................................... 198 
D. Rise of the Manufacturing Aristocracy and an Era of Change... 199 
E.  Enactment  of  the  “Modern”  Estate Tax ...................................... 202 
F. Andrew Mellon and the Framing of the Opposition .................... 205 
G. Subsequent Developments........................................................... 208 
VI. REFRAMING THE ISSUE ................................................................... 208 
 
Pop Quiz. Which of the following quotes best describes the necessi-
ty of the federal estate tax? 
(a) “Dynastic  wealth, the enemy of a meritocracy, is on the rise. 
Equality of opportunity has been on the decline . . . . A pro-
gressive and meaningful estate tax is needed to curb the 
movement  of  a  democracy  toward  plutocracy.” 
—Warren Buffett1 
(b) “[T]he  death  tax  . . . taxes income that has already been taxed 
once before, and which encourages elaborate schemes for 
transferring  wealth.” 
—Mitt Romney2 
(c) “The  death   tax   results   in   the  double   taxation  of  many   family  
assets while hurting the source of most new jobs in this coun-
try—America’s  small  business  and  farms.” 
—George W. Bush3 
(d) “I  believe  that  those  of  us  who  have  benefited  so  greatly  from  
our  country’s  investment  in  our  lives  should  be  asked  to  give  a  
portion of our wealth back to invest in opportunities for the fu-
ture. Society has a just claim on our fortunes and that claim 
goes  by  the  name  estate  tax.” 
—Bill Gates Sr.4 
  
 1. Kevin Drawbaugh, Buffett Backs Estate Tax, Decries Wealth Gap, REUTERS, Nov. 14, 
2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/14/us-buffett-congress-
idUSN1442383020071114 (quoting Warren Buffett). 
 2. Mitt Romney, Obama Would Tax Economy to Death, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 1, 2012, at 
19. 
 3. Chelsea Trull, House Votes Down Federal Estate Taxes, MICH. DAILY, Apr. 13, 2005, 
https://www.michigandaily.com/content/house-votes-down-federal-estate-taxes (quoting George W. 
Bush). 
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Feeling confused? Ambivalent? Outraged? Vindicated? In any case, 
you are probably in good company. These men know how to pull at your 
heartstrings. They intentionally framed the issue in terms of your core 
values. How do they know what values are important to you? That part is 
easy. Sociology tells us that Americans have a collective set of core val-
ues and that they use these values to evaluate political issues.5 Politicians 
and other public figures vying for our support on a particular issue know 
this, and they will frame their particular stance in terms of these values. 
However, when we are presented with the issue already framed in terms 
of conflicting core values or conflicting interpretations of the same core 
values, many of us become confused, fail to evaluate the issue ourselves, 
or become ambivalent.6  
The men in your pop quiz are not helping matters. All four men are 
college-educated Americans.7 All four earned graduate degrees in law, 
economics, or business.8 All four are millionaires, and at least one is a 
billionaire.9 And yet, this seemingly homogenous group cannot agree on 
the mere existence of the federal estate tax. They all framed the issue 
slightly differently, and yet you likely felt some sort of emotional re-
sponse to each argument. That gut feeling you experience when con-
fronted with issues framed in terms of ideas like equality, democracy, 
and opportunity is natural, but it is also the federal   estate   tax’s  biggest  
problem. 
This Article examines the ascendancy of wealth redistribution as the 
policy underpinning the federal estate tax through the lens of sociology, 
and argues that by attempting to ensure equal access to the American 
  
 4. Bill Gates, Sr., Strengthening the Estate Tax to Strengthen the Country, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 17, 2009, 6:16PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-gates-senior/strengthening-the-
estate_b_396444.html.  
 5. See Paul R. Brewer, Values, Political Knowledge, and Public Opinion About Gay Rights, 
67 PUB. OPINION. Q. 173, 173 (2003). 
 6. See id. at 177–78. 
 7. See About Mitt, MITT ROMNEY, http://www.mittromney.com/learn/mitt (last visited Sept. 
14, 2012); George W. Bush, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewbush (last visited Sept. 14, 2012); Warren 
Buffett, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/warren-buffett-9230729 (last visited Sept. 
14, 2012); William H. Gates, Sr., BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/leadership/Pages/william-gates-sr.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2012). 
 8. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 9. See Steve Holland & Kim Dixon, Mitt Romney Tax Returns Released: Paid Just 13.9% 
Rate in 2010, Had Swiss Bank Account, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2012, 11:24PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/24/mitt-romney-tax-returns-released_n_1225247.html; The 
Net Worth of the American Presidents: From Washington to Obama to ___, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 9, 
2012, 1:26PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/american-presidents-republican-candidates-net-
worth-2012-1?op=1; Warren Buffett, supra note  7.  William  H.  Gates  Sr.’s  millionaire status is in-
ferred  based  upon  his  son’s  approximate  net  worth  of  $61  billion  and  status  as  the  second  wealthiest  
person  in  the  world,  in  addition  to  Gates  Sr.’s  professional  background  as  a  founding  partner  at  K&L  
Gates (formerly Preston Gates & Ellis), a Seattle law firm where partners averaged $890,000 in 
profits in 2012. Cf. Firm Profiles: K&L Gates, AM. LAW., 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/firmProfile.jsp?name=K%26L+Gates (last updated Jan. 1, 2012); 
The  World’s  Billionaires, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/ (Apr. 24, 2012); William H. 
Gates, Sr., supra note 7. 
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dream by penalizing only those who have fulfilled its promise, the feder-
al estate tax places fundamental American values in irreconcilable con-
flict. The reason that the current system does not work, I argue, is rooted 
more in history and sociology than in economics. The solution is not 
necessarily the repeal of the federal estate tax. Nor is the solution as sim-
ple as replacing the estate tax with an inheritance tax, implementing an 
accessions tax, or taxing inheritances as income, as proposed by other 
commentators.10 The estate tax plays, or should play, an important role in 
ensuring vertical and horizontal equity in our federal tax system. Perhaps 
more importantly, it also has the potential to provide a safety net of reve-
nue during times of financial exigency, such as that currently faced by 
our nation. In order to achieve these goals, however, we must first cor-
rectly recognize the fundamental problem with the current system. When 
the history of the tax is examined from a sociological and historical van-
tage point, the real problem becomes clear.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of any system of taxation is to raise revenue.11 
However, the federal estate tax, and by extension the federal gift tax, has 
two concurrent goals. In addition to providing a source of revenue, the 
tax   promotes   a   supposedly   important   social   goal   of   preventing   “exces-
sive”   accumulations  of   inherited  wealth.12 This social aspect of the tax 
pits conservatives and liberals against each other in an increasingly toxic 
debate. Yet, the modern federal estate tax has not accomplished either 
goal with much success.  
Understanding the evolution of the wealth redistribution goal and 
the public reaction to that goal is critical to understanding the futility of 
the current debate and in analyzing how to move forward. The current 
rhetoric surrounding the estate tax is no different from that of the past. 
This Article argues that the real source of this debate is a conflict be-
tween several core American values. Regardless of where your personal 
opinions may lie in this debate, the sociological history of the estate tax 
reveals several truths: (1) we are unlikely to ever reach a consensus re-
garding the appropriateness of the supposed wealth redistribution policy; 
(2) that policy is what converts a useful and potentially fair tax to a polit-
ically polarizing one; and (3) the estate tax has the potential to provide 
much needed revenue during times of national exigency. To achieve this 
potential, we must remove any wealth redistribution policy from the tax.  
  
 10. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and 
Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1178–79 (1978). 
 11. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., Joseph J. Thorndike, What’s   the   Estate   Tax   Supposed   to   Do,   Anyway?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2010, 9:52AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-j-
thorndike/whats-the-estate-tax-supp_b_797577.html. 
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Part II of this Article   explores   what   sociologists   call   our   “core  
American   values”   and   examines   how   these   values   affect   our   political  
attitudes. Part III of this Article briefly summarizes the various methods 
of taxing gratuitous property transfers at death. Part IV summarizes the 
nature of a tax policy debate and argues that the federal estate tax debate 
is somewhat unique. Part V examines the history of the federal estate tax 
through a sociological lens in an effort to provide insight to the current 
debate. Part V argues that the current debate can be traced back to two 
sources, both of which are utterly inapplicable in modern times. Propo-
nents of the tax owe their lineage to revolutionary Americans and their 
efforts to change a political system that was stacked against them. Oppo-
nents of the tax owe their lineage largely to Andrew Mellon, a Treasury 
Secretary who embarked on a mission to destroy the estate tax. The Arti-
cle concludes in Part VI by reframing the federal estate tax as an efficient 
and practical mechanism for raising revenue during times of crisis. 
II. SOCIOLOGY AND CORE AMERICAN VALUES 
A. Sociological Values 
What characteristics define Americans? What is American culture? 
Sociologist Robin M. Williams Jr. went in search of the answers to these 
questions more than sixty years ago. In his seminal text, American Socie-
ty: A Sociological Interpretation, Williams identified a list of core Amer-
ican   “values.”   In   the   sociological   context,   the   term   “value”   refers   to  
“broad  cultural  principles   that  most  people  in  a  society consider desira-
ble.”13 Values,  as  Williams  explained,  “are  not the concrete goals of ac-
tion, but rather the criteria by  which   goals   are   chosen.”14 As a result, 
people sharing the same values might express those values differently, or 
they might extrapolate them into different expressions of sociological 
norms.15  
Looking at the work of other observers, Williams noted that several 
traits could be seen in American society during all major historical peri-
ods. These traits included  
associational activity, democracy, and belief and faith in it; belief in 
the equality of all as a fact and as a right; freedom of the individual in 
ideal and in fact; disregard of law—“direct action;;” local govern-
ment; practicality; prosperity and general material well-being; puri-
tanism; emphasis on religion, and its great influence in national life; 
uniformity and conformity.16 
  
 13. JON M. SHEPARD, SOCIOLOGY 67 (10th ed. 2010).  
 14. ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 440 
(3d ed. 1970). 
 15. See SHEPARD, supra note 13. 
 16. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 453. 
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Williams saw these recurring themes and sought to reduce them to their 
abstract forms—that   is,   their   core   essence   as   a   “value.”17 Williams ex-
plained that from a historical   standpoint,   our   values   developed   “out   of  
religious tradition, frontier experience, ceaseless change, vast opportuni-
ty,  and  fluid  social  structure.”18 The experiences of colonial and revolu-
tionary Americans set the course for development of an American culture 
that is distinct and identifiable in terms of our collection of values. In his 
quest to understand America, Williams eventually identified fifteen core 
American values. Those values were later summarized as follows: 
Table 1: Williams List of Central American Values19 
 
1. Achievement and success as the primary goal of every individual. 
2. Activity and work, with little emphasis on leisure and a disdain for 
laziness. 
3. Moral orientation, including the absolute judgments of good and bad 
or right and wrong. 
4. Humanitarianism realized through philanthropy and aid to those in 
need or crisis. 
5. Efficiency and practicality, as demonstrated by seeking the fastest 
and least costly means of achieving a goal. 
6. Process and progress—a belief in future development and techno-
logical advancement.  
7. Material comfort,  sometimes  articulated  as  “the  American  Dream.” 
8. Equality in its most abstract form—as an ideal rather than a policy. 
9. Freedom expressed by emphasizing rights of the individual over the 
state. 
10. External conformity,  meaning  that  one  strives  to  be  a  “team  player”  
and  does  not  “rock  the  boat.” 
11. Science and rationality as the primary vehicles by which to master 
the environment for material benefits. 
12. Nationalism and the belief that U.S. values and institutions are the 
very best in the world. 
13. Democracy based on personal freedom and equal opportunity. 
  
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. at 458–59 (citation omitted). 
 19. Karen A. Cerulo, Social Relations, Core Values, and the Polyphony of the American 
Experience, 23 SOC. F. 351, 352 (2008).  
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14. Individualism or the emphasis of personal rights and responsibilities. 
15. Racism and group superiority or the edification of a white, Anglo-
Saxon, or northern European racial background. 
 
The values Williams identified are both interrelated and contradic-
tory.20 For instance, the value of achievement/success is clearly related to 
activity/work and material comfort. On the other hand, the values of in-
dividualism and freedom are, in some respects, contradictory to the val-
ues of external conformity and group superiority. Williams recognized 
the potential for conflict, explaining that “persistent and widespread val-
ue-tension leads to political struggle, schismatic cleavages, or the segre-
gation  of  various  groupings  into  a  kind  of  mosaic  society.”21 Later soci-
ologists expanded on this theme, finding that although these core values 
are always present, they also shift in terms of importance over time and 
among individuals.22 The expression of these values as societal norms 
and behaviors changes over time and from person to person.23  
B. Values and Political Attitudes 
Our values play an important role in shaping public opinion regard-
ing political issues.24 Not only do Americans use their core values to 
decide where they stand on a specific issue, the manner in which public 
figures frame those issues for us directly impacts our opinions.25 “Values  
are  within  everyone’s  mental grasp, so they [can] be employed as a gen-
eral evaluative standard for generating and organizing reactions to politi-
cal   issues.”26 Politicians and pundits know this, and they use it to their 
advantage.   The   “ability   to   frame   issues   . . . is undoubtedly one of the 
most  important  ‘tools’  that  political  elites  have  at  their  disposal.”27 As a 
result,   “policy   controversies   confronting   the   public   are,   themselves,   al-
most  always  phrased  in  terms  of  values.”28 When politicians disagree on 
an issue, for whatever reason, they often frame the issue in terms of 
“widely shared values.”29  
Politicians know that framing an issue in the light of a core Ameri-
can value affects how people react to that issue.30 Of course, in the realm 
  
 20. SHEPARD, supra note 13, at 68. 
 21. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 452. 
 22. See Cerulo, supra note 19, at 353. 
 23. See SHEPARD, supra note 13, at 68; Cerulo, supra note 19, at 353. 
 24. See William G. Jacoby, Value Choices and American Public Opinion, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
706, 716 (2006). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. at 715–16. 
 27. Brewer, supra note 5, at 176 (alterations in original) (quoting William G. Jacoby, Issue 
Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 750, 751 (2000)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. Jacoby, supra note 24. 
 29. See Brewer, supra note 5, at 176. 
 30. See id. 
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of politics, we are usually presented with conflicting interpretations of 
the same value or with competing values. The manner in which politi-
cians and other public figures frame the issues for us significantly im-
pacts  our  ultimate  opinions.  “[T]he  specific   language  employed to con-
vey information about the opposing positions on an issue could well 
prime individuals to think about certain values and ignore others while 
working  out  their  own  responses.”31  
When we are presented with conflicting applications of the same 
values, several things can happen. Consider the value of equality in the 
context of the estate tax. Suppose opponents of the tax tell you that it 
works against equality because it results in family farms and businesses 
being taxed on the same income twice. Suppose proponents of the tax tell 
you that it is necessary to ensure equality of opportunity for all Ameri-
cans by limiting inherited wealth. Sociology and public opinion research 
suggests several possible reactions. You might just become confused and 
fail to form an opinion on the issue.32 You might feel some connection to 
both arguments and end up feeling confused or ambivalent.33 You might 
reject both arguments and conclude that equality is not relevant to the 
issue of the estate tax.34  
Similar responses can occur when an issue is framed in terms of 
competing values. Suppose that opponents of the estate tax tell you that it 
punishes hard work and success. Therefore, in order to protect those val-
ues, you should eliminate the tax. Meanwhile, proponents of the tax tell 
you that it is necessary to ensure equality of opportunity and democracy 
by limiting inherited wealth. Therefore, we must keep the tax in order to 
protect those values. You could have some of the same responses you 
had when presented with competing views of the same value. But, you 
might find the argument framed in terms of success and work more com-
pelling than the argument framed in terms of equality and democracy. 
Or, you might find the equality and democracy argument more compel-
ling than the success and work argument.  
Research suggests that when presented with competing values, your 
opinion may be shaped by which value you find more important.35 We 
are  all  different,  so  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  “there  is  extremely  wide  
variability  in  personal  judgments  about  value  importance.”36 Most people 
have   “meaningful   value   hierarchies.”37 In other words, most people 
  
 31. Jacoby, supra note 24. 
 32. See Brewer, supra note 5, at 177. 
 33. See id. at 178. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Jacoby, supra note 24, at 720. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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“seem  to  recognize  that  some  values  are more important than others, and 
[such  people]  make  the  requisite  choices  between  them.”38 
Your pop quiz illustrates the most popular competing frames con-
structed around the federal estate tax. As discussed in Part V below, 
these frames have existed for a century or more. In that time, they have 
proven to be deeply divisive. I argue that these frames are also outdated, 
misguided, and utterly unsupported by the facts. Public figures on both 
sides of the debate who perpetuate these frames are irresponsible. They 
needlessly perpetuate an illogical debate. As a result, they impede the 
possibility for us to make an important and useful safety net of revenue 
available during a time of national financial crisis. If we are going to 
move forward, we should reframe the issue in terms of efficiency and 
practicality.39  
III. TAXING DEATH 
The goal of the federal tax system, as a whole, is to raise revenue 
for  the  federal  government  in  a  manner  that  is  “fair.”40 To achieve  “fair-
ness,”  we   evaluate   the   tax   system   in   light   of   concerns for vertical and 
horizontal equity.41 Principles of horizontal equity require that “similarly 
situated individuals . . . be taxed similarly . . . .”42 Meanwhile, principles 
of vertical equity provide that “individuals . . . be taxed according to their 
ability to pay.”43 To achieve both horizontal and vertical equity, most tax 
scholars agree that the system should include multiple tax bases.44 For 
example,  in  an  effort  to  achieve  “fairness,”  the  current  federal  tax  system  
includes “income, property or wealth, and consumption” in the mix of 
tax bases.45 Of course, this is a grossly generalized description. People 
fundamentally  disagree  about  what  is  “fair,”  which  persons  are  “similarly  
situated,”  and  how  we  determine  an  individual’s  “ability  to  pay.”46  
To understand the debate surrounding the federal estate tax, it is al-
so important to understand, in basic terms, what the federal estate tax is 
and what other options are available. A good portion of the scholarly 
debate over the federal estate tax examines the possibility of moving 
  
 38. Id. 
 39. See infra Part VI. 
 40. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle America Burns: Amending the 
AMT (and Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811, 818 (2004); Leo P. Martinez, “To  Lay  and  Collect  
Taxes”:   The   Constitutional   Case   for   Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 115 
(1999); Nancy E. Shurtz, A Critical View of Traditional Tax Policy Theory: A Pragmatic Alterna-
tive, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1665, 1669–71 (1986). 
 41. See STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, FEDERAL TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS: CASES AND 
PROBLEMS 10 (2d ed. 2008). 
 42. Id.; see also David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 43, 43 (2006). 
 43. WILLBANKS, supra note 41; see also Shurtz, supra note 40, at 1671. 
 44. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41; Shurtz, supra note 40. 
 45. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41. 
 46. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 40; Shurtz, supra note 40, at 1671. 
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from a federal estate tax to some other taxing regime.47 These other re-
gimes could affect aspects of horizontal or vertical equity. The merits of 
those arguments are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Any time money or property changes hands we have an opportunity 
to tax the transaction. In an overly simplistic sense, we have two options: 
(1) tax the transferee on the receipt of property; or (2) tax the transferor 
on the transfer of property. The federal tax system utilizes both options. 
With respect to the gratuitous transfer of property occurring at death, 
both options are feasible and likely constitutional.  
A. Tax the Receipt of Property  
Two methods of taxing the receipt of property from a decedent are 
commonly proposed: (1) including inheritances within the income tax; 
and (2) imposing an inheritance tax. The proposals are similar in many 
respects.  
1. Income Tax Approach 
A relatively simple way to tax property transferred at death is to in-
clude inheritances within the scope of gross income.48 The federal in-
come  tax  imposes  a  tax  on  the  receipt  of  “income”  by  a  taxpayer  during  
the calendar year.49 Every law student in an introductory income tax 
course  learns  that  income  includes  all  “undeniable  accessions  to  wealth,  
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete domin-
ion.”50 If not for a specific exception, this broad definition of income 
would clearly include any inheritance received by a taxpayer. However, 
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) specifically excludes inheritances and 
gifts from the definition of gross income.51 A very simple way to tax 
gratuitous transfers of property is to simply repeal that exclusion and 
include the receipt of any inheritance within gross income of a taxpay-
er.52 This approach would likely meet constitutional requirements and 
  
 47. See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
469, 493–96 (2007); Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect From Heirs? The Case for a 
Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (2009); Dodge, supra note 10, at 1178–80; 
Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an Income-
Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 551 passim 
(2003); Joseph M. Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax With a Reimagined Accessions Tax, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 997 passim (2009); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Gratuitous Transfers Under a Con-
sumption Tax, 51 TAX L. REV. 529 passim (1996); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for 
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 350–56 (1994). 
 48. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 8. 
 49. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 50. Comm’r  v.  Glenshaw  Glass  Co.,  346  U.S.  426,  431  (1955). 
 51. See 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 52. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 8.  
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would be fairly simple to administer.53 Additionally, taxing inheritances 
as income could simplify the tax code.54  
In all likelihood, the real problem with implementing this approach 
is that gifts and inheritances have specifically been excluded from the 
scope of the federal income tax for 100 years. Scholars and politicians 
have many explanations and justifications for the exclusion.55 In reality, 
it may just be a historical accident of sorts.56 For instance, some contend 
that including inheritances in the federal income tax system might be 
somehow  “unfair.” The federal income tax imposes a tax based on the 
value of property received by an individual taxpayer in any given year.57 
Income taxes are typically subject to a progressive rate scale, meaning 
that larger accumulations of wealth in a given year are subject to pro-
gressively higher tax rates.58 If a taxpayer receives an exceptionally and 
uncharacteristically large amount of income in one year, the IRC gener-
ally treats him no differently than a taxpayer receiving that amount of 
income every year. In other words, this approach essentially treats an 
inheritance as a windfall and would tax it no differently from any other 
windfall—for example, lottery winnings. Some people perceive a distinc-
tion between property passing to you by death—often from a close fami-
ly member—and a winning lottery ticket or exceptionally large earnings. 
As a result, some people believe the income tax approach is inherently 
unfair  because   it  would   “tax[]   unusually large receipts at progressively 
higher  rates.”59 In other words, including inheritances within the scope of 
the income tax would run afoul of principles of horizontal equity. A per-
son receiving an inheritance is, perhaps, not similarly situated to other 
taxpayers with comparable amounts of income. Moreover, taxing inher-
itances as income could violate principles of vertical equity where the 
property is illiquid or not fungible. In that case, the taxpayer would not 
have the same ability to pay as a taxpayer holding cash.60 On the other 
hand, some commentators specifically endorse including inheritances 
within the scope of gross income as a way to regulate inherited wealth.61 
As one advocate of this approach explains, “[B]y  imposing  the  tax  direct-
ly on those who receive the money, Congress could have a more honest 
discussion  regarding  the  appropriate  taxation  of  inherited  wealth.”62 
  
 53. See id. at 8–9. 
 54. See Dodge, supra note 10, at 1191. 
 55. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income 
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1992). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 58. See id. 
 59. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 9. 
 60. See Sergio Pareja, Taxation Without Liquidation: Rethinking  “Ability  to  Pay,” 2008 WIS. 
L. REV. 841, 858–59 (proposing a wealth transfer system that treats liquid and illiquid assets differ-
ently in light of ability-to-pay concerns). 
 61. Ray D. Madoff, Give Up on the Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2010, at A31. 
 62. Id. 
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2. Inheritance Tax Approach 
A second way to tax the gratuitous receipt of property at death is the 
inheritance tax.63 Like an income tax, an inheritance tax taxes the receipt 
of property by a particular beneficiary.64 However, inheritance taxes, 
which are fairly common at the state and local tax level, typically operate 
independently of the income tax system.65 Inheritance taxes, therefore, 
are not subject to the same rate scales as income taxes. That result could 
be achieved within the income tax setting by simply imposing a different 
rate of tax on inheritances, much as we do for long-term capital gains.66 
However, every existing inheritance tax ties the rate of tax imposed to 
the familial relationship between the decedent and the recipient.67 Specif-
ically, receipts from close relatives are subject to lower rates of tax than 
receipts from distant relatives or non-relatives.68 For that reason, the pol-
icy implications are somewhat distinct from the implications of taxing an 
inheritance as income.  
The familial relationship-based rate structure essentially requires the 
government   to   enact   legislation  defining  a   taxpayer’s   family   and effec-
tively ranking degrees of familial relations, a particularly problematic 
prospect given the changing views of family and society. Furthermore, 
familial relationship-based rate structures can create horizontal and verti-
cal inequity. By treating taxpayers differently based on government no-
tions of family, an inheritance tax may ignore economic reality.69 The 
inheritance tax presupposes that close relatives are not similarly situated 
to other heirs. Furthermore, by favoring transfers to close relatives, an 
inheritance tax wholly ignores their ability to pay. Finally, this approach 
seems to actually encourage accumulating wealth within the family ra-
ther than spreading the wealth around. 
B. Tax the Transfer of Property 
The modern estate tax imposes a tax on the transferor of property, 
the decedent, and his estate.70 Sometimes  described  as  “an  excise  tax  on  
the  privilege  of   transferring  property  at  death,”71 the estate tax looks at 
  
 63. By extension, this could include an accessions tax. 
 64. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 8. 
 65. See, e.g., Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not to Die in 2012, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2011, 1:11PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2011/12/22/where-not-to-die-in-2012 (providing an 
interactive map of state-level inheritance and estate taxes). 
 66. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 67. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a 
Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 78  (2009)  (“It  is  true  that  every  U.S.  state  and  
nineteen of the twenty-three countries with an inheritance tax impose higher taxes on gifts and 
bequests received from nonrelatives. Often, the tax rate rises or the exempt amount falls as the 
relationship  to  the  donor  becomes  more  attenuated.”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Bridget J. Crawford, The Profits and Penalties of Kinship: Conflicting Meanings of 
Family in Estate Tax Law, 3 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 1, 5–6 (2006). 
 70. See 26 U.S.C. § 2002 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1 (1960). 
 71. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 7. 
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the value of all of the property a decedent owned at the time of his death 
and applies a tax directly on the gratuitous transfer of that property.72 
Unlike the income tax and the inheritance tax approaches, the estate tax 
looks at the property in the hands of the decedent rather than the property 
received by any particular beneficiary.73 Thus,  the  decedent’s  estate,  not  
the beneficiary is primarily liable for the payment of the tax.74 The cur-
rent federal system employs an estate tax.75 However, the current system 
does not apply an estate tax in the strict sense. For instance, like an inher-
itance tax, transfers to certain beneficiaries—namely charities and sur-
viving spouses—are treated favorably.76 In fact, these transfers are essen-
tially exempt from the estate tax.77 Furthermore, decedents receive a 
credit against the tax.78 Under the current system, the credit is so large 
the decedent will not face any estate tax until the amount of property he 
transfers to someone other than a charity or his surviving spouse exceeds 
$5 million.79 As a result, very few estates are subject to the tax, and it 
does not raise a significant amount of revenue.80 However, keeping the 
current federal estate tax system in place, this could easily be changed by 
adjusting the various credits and deductions available.  
IV. TAX POLICY AND THE NATURE OF POLICY DEBATES 
Congress uses tax laws in order to promote a variety of social and 
political policies. The heart of most current tax debates stems from the 
non-revenue purposes of the tax laws, namely (1) the redistribution of 
wealth, and (2) the regulation of private sector activity.81 Although 
Americans disagree about the amount of revenue that should be raised, 
the simple notion of imposing a variety of taxes to raise revenue is not 
particularly controversial. Using the federal tax system to achieve some 
social-engineering function, however, is a different story,82 and that is the 
source of a good deal of policy debate. Because the federal tax system is 
one  of  the  federal  government’s  most  powerful  tools,  regulatory  and  re-
distributive policies are absolutely pervasive in the federal tax system. 
A. Typical Policy Debate: Home-Mortgage Interest Deduction 
To understand the nature of a tax policy debate from a sociological 
perspective,   let’s  begin  with  a   familiar  example:   the   income   tax  deduc-
  
 72. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See 26 U.S.C. § 2002. 
 75. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001. 
 76. See 26 U.S.C. § 2055 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (charitable deduction); 26 U.S.C. § 2056 
(2006) (marital deduction). 
 77. See sources cited supra note 76. 
 78. 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493, 
1493 (2000). 
 81. Avi-Yonah, supra note 11. 
 82. See id. 
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tion allowed for home-mortgage interest. Few people seriously debate 
the fundamental legitimacy of the federal income tax as a means for rais-
ing government revenue. Rather, the major arguments surround the so-
cial engineering aspects of the tax. Congress often expresses a redistribu-
tive or regulatory goal in the form of a deduction or credit, which 
amounts to a government expenditure promoting the activity.  
The home-mortgage interest tax deduction is an example most 
Americans will understand and is a good illustration of this idea. The 
IRC allows individual taxpayers to deduct the interest paid on their home 
mortgage from their gross income.83 As a deduction, this aspect of the 
federal income tax does not raise revenue. Rather, its main goals relate to 
taxation’s  other  two  purposes:  redistribution  and regulation. The deduc-
tion is redistributive because it amounts to a governmental expenditure 
aimed at assisting taxpayers in acquiring property.84 This would help 
taxpayers literally buy in to the American dream of home ownership.85 
The deduction is regulatory  because  it  supposedly  “steer[s]  private  sector  
activity   in   the   directions   desired   by   government[].”86 In theory, home 
ownership results in many societal economic benefits; therefore, our 
government seeks to incentivize ownership through this deduction.87 
After the housing market collapse, some commentators questioned 
the wisdom of this incredibly popular deduction.88 Opponents of the de-
duction argue that it incentivized overinvestment in housing, which con-
tributed to the collapse in the housing market.89 Moreover, the benefits of 
the   deduction   increase   with   the   taxpayer’s   income   and   the   size   of   his  
mortgage,  prompting  opponents  to  characterize  it  as  “the  most  inequita-
ble  and  inefficient  provision  in  the  Internal  Revenue  Code.”90 Both sides 
of this argument have merit.91 But, repeal is very unlikely: this deduction 
is incredibly popular. Naturally, many Americans support the deductions 
for which they are eligible. But it is more than that. Knowing what we do 
about issue framing, that is unsurprising. Proponents framed their argu-
ment  in  terms  of  promoting  the  “American  dream,”  and  this  dream  drew  
on a number of core values. The opposition, in contrast, primarily frames 
  
 83. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h) (2006). 
 84. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the 
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1352–53 (2000). 
 85. See Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and 
Effect, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33, 51–52 (2009); see also Mann, supra note 84, at 1348–50; Ben 
Steverman, A Taxing Debate: The Mortgage-Interest Deduction, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2011, 
9:13AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-17/a-taxing-debate-the-mortgage-interest-
deduction.html.  
 86. Avi-Yonah, supra note 11. 
 87. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 84, at 1354 (discussing various arguments that homeowner-
ship improves society and the economy). 
 88. See, e.g., Hardaway, supra note 85, at 33; Steverman, supra note 85. 
 89. See, e.g., Hardaway, supra note 85, at 46; Steverman, supra note 85. 
 90. Steverman, supra note 85 (quoting Dennis J. Ventry Jr., a tax law specialist from the 
University of California Davis School of Law); see also Hardaway, supra note 85, at 50–51. 
 91. See Mann, supra note 84, at 1353. 
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its argument in terms of practicality and efficiency—values which may 
rank lower in many Americans’   value   hierarchies.   And,   perhaps   more  
importantly, the opposition has not attained a significant level of media 
saturation compared to proponents. As a result, many Americans are 
likely  unfamiliar  with  the  opposition’s  frame.92 
B. Atypical Policy Debate: The Federal Estate Tax 
The federal estate tax, and by extension the federal gift tax and gen-
eration-skipping transfer tax, is an example of this type of debate taken 
to the extreme. Unlike other tax policy debates, the extreme positions are 
expressed not only by academics, but also by widely recognized public 
figures, as illustrated by your pop quiz. And their positions are truly ex-
treme. Given what we know about sociology, issue framing, and public 
opinion, their positions are problematic and irresponsible. Rather than 
challenging a single aspect of the overall estate tax system, like a specific 
credit or deduction, opponents advocate eliminating the tax in its entire-
ty.93 And some proponents go so far as to advocate using it to entirely 
eliminate inherited wealth.94 Other proponents would keep the tax re-
gardless of actual revenue need. 
For that reason, this debate is inherently different from other tax 
policy debates. The debate concerning the redistributive and regulatory 
policies of the home-mortgage interest deduction, for instance, rarely 
results in calls for repeal of the federal income tax in its entirety. That 
debate, and similar debates, focuses on the legitimacy of the policy ad-
vanced and the effectiveness of the IRC in promoting the policy. The 
estate tax debate, however, is full of extremists and particularly plagued 
by misleading rhetoric framed in terms of core American values. Oppo-
nents are willing to fully abandon a constitutional source of federal reve-
nue, during a time when that revenue is badly needed, because of the 
social engineering goals of the tax. Some proponents support the social 
aspects of the tax so passionately that they would keep the tax even dur-
ing times of government surplus. And these arguments are particularly 
infuriating when we consider that in its century-long existence, the mod-
ern estate tax has never actually accomplished its purported goal of regu-
lating inherited wealth.95  
Your pop quiz illustrates the current debate and the fundamental fal-
lacies it perpetuates. Both sides frame the debate in terms of fundamental 
American values. The values they point to are contradictory. To propo-
  
 92. See Brewer, supra note 5. 
 93. See, e.g., Does the Death Tax Have a Date with the Grim Reaper?, LIFEHEALTHPRO 
(Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2012/03/01/does-the-death-tax-have-a-date-with-the-
grim-reape.  
 94. See Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 72–73 (1990). 
 95. See DANIEL MILLER, JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
ESTATE TAX 5–6 (1999). 
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nents, the estate tax ensures the core American values of democracy and 
equality of opportunity by taking wealth out of the hands of the richest 
Americans and returning it back into society.96 The redistribution fur-
thers democracy by ensuring equality of opportunity.97 It ensures that no 
one  starts   life  on  better   footing  simply  by  winning   the  “parent   lottery.”  
These are emotionally powerful arguments supported by few facts. For 
instance, consider Warren Buffett’s   argument:   “Dynastic   wealth,   the  
enemy of a meritocracy, is on the rise. Equality of opportunity has been 
on the decline . . . . A progressive and meaningful estate tax is needed to 
curb the  movement  of  a  democracy  toward  plutocracy.”98 Recent reports 
do seem to support a part of Buffett’s  argument—that  is,  that  America’s  
wealth is concentrated in the hands of relatively few Americans.99 Fur-
thermore, excessive concentrations of wealth do result in very real social 
harms and tend to undermine our values of equality and democracy.100 
However, very little, if any, evidence indicates this situation directly 
results from inherited wealth.101 Although Buffett and others correctly 
identify a potential problem, little evidence supports the argument that 
the estate tax is an appropriate or even effective remedy to that prob-
lem.102 Despite   its   existence   for   nearly   100   years,   “[n]o   one   knows  
whether the estate tax minimizes   concentrations   of  wealth.”103 In truth, 
the modern problem of wealth inequalities more likely stems from prob-
lems with our economic system, not our political system.104 
The quotation from Bill Gates Sr. takes a slightly different approach 
by arguing that those Americans who financially benefit the most during 
life owe a debt to this country.105 Gates is appealing, in part, to our hu-
manitarian values. He is also appealing to our equality values. To Gates 
and other proponents, our core American values enabled their families to 
achieve such great success, and as a result, those who benefit the most 
from  American   society   owe   society   a   debt   for   that   success.   In  Gates’s  
words:  “Society  has  a  just  claim  on  our  fortunes  and  that  claim  goes  by  
the  name  estate  tax.”106 However, that is merely political rhetoric.107 Alt-
hough wealthy Americans might have some moral obligation to give 
  
 96. See Drawbaugh, supra note 1. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. (quoting Warren Buffett). 
 99. See Income Distribution: Poor, Rich, and Richest, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2011, 
12:53PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/25/income-distribution-in 
2008_n_1030201.html. 
 100. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 13. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. at 14. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 831–
33 (2001). 
 105. See Gates, supra note 4. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Cf. William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, Rhetoric and Economics in the Estate Tax Debate, 
54 NAT’L TAX J. 613, 623–24 (2001). 
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back to society, this does not necessarily mean Americans should have a 
legal obligation to do so. Moreover, it is unclear whether the estate tax, 
or any tax for that matter, is an appropriate, effective, or efficient mecha-
nism for compelling compliance with that obligation. In fact, history 
indicates the contrary is true.108 
Arguments made by opponents of the tax are equally flawed. To 
opponents, the estate tax is antithetical to many of our core American 
values, including achievement/success, activity/work, and material com-
fort. The estate tax punishes achievement and success by taxing income 
that has already been taxed once during life. Similarly, the estate tax pre-
vents activity and work by harming family farms and businesses. Again, 
these are emotionally powerful arguments. But they are also arguments 
unsupported by the facts. Both Mitt Romney and George W. Bush make 
the double-taxation argument in your pop quiz. That argument is flawed 
in some respects and an oversimplification in others. The federal tax sys-
tem   taxes   taxpayers,   not   assets,   and   “[i]t is a fact that money used to 
make bequests . . . may be   taxed  more  than  once.”109 In truth, many as-
sets in our economy are subject to multiple layers of tax, of which the 
estate tax is only one.110 Nothing is inherently unfair about that outcome. 
On the flip side, many assets taxed at death were never taxed by the in-
come tax.111 And, if they were taxed, they were likely taxed at preferen-
tial capital gains rates.112  
The quote from former President Bush reflects the other prominent 
argument  made  by  opponents:   the  estate  tax  “hurt[s]  the  source  of  most  
new jobs in this country—America’s   small  business and  farms.”113 The 
family-farm-and-small-business argument invokes another aspect of the 
American dream: work and activity should be rewarded, not punished. 
We should not impose burdens on those job creators. By framing the 
issue this way, opponents make an incredibly powerful argument, partic-
ularly in a struggling economy when people tend to place a high value on 
their own immediate job security. At its core, this argument supposedly 
reflects the concern that some business owners may lack the cash liquidi-
ty at death to pay the estate tax without having to sell an interest in their 
business.114 As a result, opponents contend, hard work is punished, busi-
nesses are destroyed, and jobs are lost. But the facts do not support this 
argument.115 Quite simply, the contention that the estate tax destroys 
  
 108. See infra Part V. 
 109. Gale & Slemrod, supra note 107, at 624. 
 110. Id. at 624–25. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Trull, supra note 3 (quoting George W. Bush). 
 114. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 17. 
 115. See id. at 17–18; see also Gale & Slemrod, supra note 107, at 618; Robert Frank, Does the 
Estate Tax Hurt Farmers and Family Businesses?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2010, 11:51AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2010/12/16/does-the-estate-tax-hurt-farmers-and-family-businesses/. 
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family farms and small businesses is a myth.116 Moreover, the IRC itself 
provides many accommodations aimed at alleviating harsh results of this 
largely illusory problem.117 
V. VIEWING THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 
THROUGH A SOCIOLOGY LENS 
The issue framing in the current federal estate tax debate is toxic 
and irresponsible. In a time of national exigency, when revenue is des-
perately needed, the federal estate tax has the potential to provide a safe-
ty net. History shows us that potential. But history also shows us where 
we went wrong. Attaching a social policy to the tax in its entirety, rather 
than one credit or deduction, rendered that safety net unusable. The so-
cial policy placed fundamental and deeply entrenched American values 
in irreconcilable conflict with each other. Moreover, history shows us 
that the manner in which the debate is presently framed no longer makes 
sense, if it ever did. Proponents frame the issue in terms that made sense 
during colonial and revolutionary times. The economic landscape of our 
country has obviously changed dramatically since those days. As a result, 
this argument is no longer applicable. Opponents frame the issue in the 
manner outlined by Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon in the 1920s. His 
positions were largely motivated by a single unique case, the Estate of 
Frick. His positions were not really supported by the facts when he made 
them nearly 100 years ago. They remain equally unsupportable today. 
Yet, because both sides framed the issue so powerfully in terms of core 
American values, the debate continued along the same lines relatively 
unaltered. Enough is enough. The time has come to reframe the issue in 
terms that are actually supported by facts. 
A. Revolutionary Core American Values and Politics 
Many of our core American values developed as a result of the 
shared experiences of colonial and revolutionary Americans, and that is 
particularly true of the values commonly seen in the federal estate tax 
debate. Williams explained that from a historical standpoint, our values 
developed   “out   of   religious   tradition,   frontier   experience,   ceaseless  
change,  vast  opportunity,  and  fluid  social  structure.”118 For instance, ac-
tivity  and  work  were  “required  for  group survival along the moving fron-
tier from the  first  settlements  until   the  continent  had  been  won.”119 The 
Protestant religious tradition supported this value, viewing successful 
work and activity as a “sign of grace.”120 Furthermore, the bulk of Amer-
ica’s  early  population  originated  from  the  working  classes in Europe and 
  
 116. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 17–18; see also David Cay Johnston, Talk of Lost 
Farms Reflects Muddle of Estate Tax Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at A1. 
 117. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 18. 
 118. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 458–59 (citation omitted). 
 119. Id. at 459. 
 120. Id. 
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Britain.121 These same factors resulted in the emergence of equality of 
opportunity as a core value. Most colonists, being from middle- and low-
er-class origins, expressly rejected the class distinctions of Britain and 
Europe.122 As Williams   observed,   “Mass accessibility to abundant re-
sources  made  it  seem  possible  for  ‘anyone  to  become  a  king  on  his  own’  
and thus helped to dissolve old hierarchies and social forms through 
movement,   acquisition,   and   independence.”123 The value of equality of 
opportunity was further made a part of our culture through “the deeply 
individualistic tendencies in Protestantism.”124 
These same factors shaped early American views on economics and 
politics. Revolutionary leaders were deeply concerned about the appro-
priate distribution of wealth and wanted to ensure equitable, but not nec-
essarily equal, distribution.125 To these leaders, appropriate wealth distri-
bution could only be attained through appropriate political structures. 
Given   the   revolutionaries’   firsthand   experience with the European and 
British class structures and monarchies, their concerns and beliefs were 
understandable. Political institutions had enabled and maintained these 
class distinctions. The decision to form a republic government was, in 
many ways, truly  revolutionary.  Americans  understood  that  “if  property  
were concentrated in the hands of a few in a republic, those few would 
use their wealth to control other citizens, seize political power, and warp 
the  republic  into  an  oligarchy.”126 In the view of these early Americans, 
the political systems of Europe and Britain were the source of inequity.127 
The solution, in their minds, rested on the rejection of those political 
institutions. Specifically, they had to reject the political institutions that 
had enabled and maintained the aristocracy. 
To the revolutionaries, appropriate wealth distribution depended on 
adopting a political system that utilized the labor theory of property, as 
epitomized  by  John  Locke.  Under  this  theory,  “only  an  individual’s  labor  
created property, and therefore the individual had sole right to possession 
and   disposition   of   that   property.”128 “[P]roperty was the just reward of 
those  who  toiled”  under  this  view.129 Wealth achieved in a manner con-
sistent with the American values of work and activity was acceptable and 
desirable. Aristocracy, and the policies that maintained it in Europe and 
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 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. James L. Huston, The American Revolutionaries, the Political Economy of Aristocracy, 
and the American Concept of the Distribution of Wealth, 1765–1900, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 1079, 1080 
(1993). 
 127. Id. at 1103–04. 
 128. Id. at 1081. 
 129. Id. 
File: Issue1_Carter_FINAL_ToDarby_021913 Created on: 2/19/2013 10:33:00 PM Last Printed: 2/19/2013 10:33:00 PM 
194 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1 
Britain, was the enemy of an appropriate distribution of wealth.130 Given 
that mindset, the evolution of American inheritance laws is unsurprising.  
B. Early American Inheritance Law and Policy 
The origins of the federal estate tax, and the ensuing debate, are tied 
to the evolution of American inheritance laws. Early Americans relied 
heavily on English law in designing their own legal systems. The case of 
inheritance  laws,  however,  was  complicated  by  America’s  newly  formed  
values, which were distinct from those of Britain.131 It was also compli-
cated  by  America’s  desire  to  eradicate   the  political   institutions   that  had  
enabled the aristocracy. From a philosophical standpoint, two views of 
inheritance were popular at the time. America could view the right to 
transfer property at death as a natural right or as a civil right, philoso-
phies advocated by John Locke and William Blackstone, respectively.132 
Both men, of course, were influential in shaping American law.  
John Locke believed that men possessed certain inalienable, natural 
rights, including life, liberty, and property.133 By extension, Locke con-
tended that inheritance was similarly a natural right belonging to chil-
dren.134 This right, as Locke explained, went far beyond merely ensuring 
a  decedent’s  children  did  not  end  up  destitute. 
For children being by the course of nature born weak and unable to 
provide for themselves, they have by the appointment of God him-
self, who hath thus ordered the course of nature, a right to be nour-
ished and maintained by their parents; nay, a right not only to a bare 
subsistence, but to the conveniences and comforts of life as far as the 
conditions of their parents can afford it.135 
As a natural right, the right to inheritance was inalienable and could not 
be altered by law.  
On the other hand, Blackstone took the position that inheritance was 
merely a civil right.  
The right of inheritance, or descent to the children and relations of 
the deceased, seems to have been allowed much earlier than the right 
of devising by testament. We are apt to conceive at first view that it 
has nature on its side; yet we often mistake for nature what we find 
established by long and inveterate custom. It is certainly a wise and 
effectual, but clearly a political, establishment; since the permanent 
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right of property, vested in the ancestor himself, was no natural, but 
merely a civil, right.136  
Blackstone acknowledged that it was customary in many countries to 
leave property to your immediate family at your death.137 However, in 
Blackstone’s  view,  the  fact  that  a  decedent’s  family  and  children  tended  
to be the recipients of his property did not mean that they were entitled to 
it as a matter of natural law.  
America, ostensibly   at   least,   adopted   Blackstone’s   view   of   inher-
itance as a civil right.138 Acceptance of that view had important conse-
quences. As a civil right, inheritance was not necessarily a right that 
would later be protected by the Constitution.139 As a civil, rather than a 
natural, right, government possessed a theoretically unlimited ability to 
regulate inheritances.140 As one observer noted:  
A right which exists solely by the creative act of the law can, of 
course, be taken away by law, or it can be limited or modified in any 
way which seems desirable. If the government should take the half or 
whole of every inheritance by its taxing power, no natural right 
would be violated.141 
However,  Americans  probably  never  fully  bought  in  to  Blackstone’s  
approach followed to its natural conclusion—that is, being able to trans-
fer property at death is merely a privilege that government grants and that 
government can take away. That view would ultimately prove incon-
sistent with American values.  
To colonial and revolutionary Americans, however, the civil-rights-
versus-natural-rights debate was probably less important than the actual 
enactment   of   positive   law.   Although  Americans   accepted   Blackstone’s  
underlying theory of inheritance, they soon rejected the English law of 
inheritance as memorialized by Blackstone.142 English inheritance law in 
the time of Blackstone still maintained many aspects of its own compli-
cated feudal past.143 Eighteenth-century English inheritance law provided 
for  the  disposition  of  a  decedent’s  property  either  pursuant to a will or, in 
the absence of a will, by the law of intestacy.144 Progressive in some re-
spects,   feudal   in   others,   “[t]he   law   controlling   both   testamentary   and  
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intestate succession was, to modern eyes, a frightfully complicated me-
lange of half-modernized  medievalisms.”145 
Englishmen enjoyed fairly expansive freedom to dispose of proper-
ty by will in whatever manner they deemed fit.146 This was, in some re-
spects,   a   departure   from  England’s   feudal   past.   However,   some   feudal  
practices remained. For instance, the doctrine of entail, a remnant of feu-
dal England, allowed the testator to prevent certain beneficiaries from 
alienating the real property bequeathed to them, thus allowing the testa-
tor to continue controlling property from the grave.147 The intestate 
scheme of property distribution showed even more aspects of feudal ide-
ology. Primogeniture was the default intestacy scheme.148 If a decedent 
died intestate, his eldest son inherited his real estate to the exclusion of 
other children.149 The   decedent’s   personal   property was distributed 
among his children and his surviving spouse.150 
Both primogeniture and entail were critical to establishing and 
maintaining a landed aristocracy in England. To revolutionary Ameri-
cans,  these  practices  “were  among  the  most  important  props of aristocrat-
ic  society  and  generators  of  inequality.”151 Initially, these practices con-
tinued in Colonial America.152 By the end of the Revolution, however, 
virtually all of the colonies expressly rejected primogeniture and en-
tail.153 At the time, Americans saw the abolition of primogeniture and 
entail  “as  one  of  the  revolution’s  greatest  achievements  and  guarantors  of  
republican  equality.”154 Revolutionary Americans knew from their own 
British and European experiences that large inheritances prohibited elec-
tive representative government.155 Money is power and large accumula-
tions of money via inheritance prevented men from having equal oppor-
tunity to participate in government.156 Thus, Revolutionary Americans 
expressly rejected practices such as primogeniture and entail, which 
served mainly to preserve inherited wealth. Moreover, these English 
practices  had  “furnished   the  principle   that  defined  the  succession  to  the  
Crown and the peerage.”157 These were precisely the institutions Ameri-
cans sought to eradicate. 
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Looking to break with English tradition and embracing the new 
“American”  values,  Thomas  Paine  and  Thomas  Jefferson  were  two  of  the  
most vocal opponents of inherited wealth at the time.158 Both men framed 
the issue in terms of core American values. These frames remain rela-
tively unaltered in the modern federal estate tax debate—a debate for 
which they are no longer well suited. Thomas Jefferson argued that in-
herited   wealth   led   to   an   “artificial   aristocracy,   founded   on   wealth   and  
birth, without either   talent   or   virtue.”159 Paine similarly viewed inher-
itance as a possible threat to representative government.  
To the evil of monarchy we have added that of hereditary succession; 
and as the first is a degradation and lessening of ourselves, so the 
second, claimed as a matter of right, is an insult and an imposition on 
posterity. For all men being originally equals, no one by birth could 
have a right to set up his own family in perpetual preference to all 
others for ever, and through himself might deserve some decent de-
gree of honors of his contemporaries, yet his descendants might be 
far too unworthy to inherit them.160 
Both Paine and Jefferson presented various ideas for eliminating 
and preventing the perceived injustices perpetuated by English inher-
itance practices.161 They advocated for abolishing entail and primogeni-
ture.162 They proposed more egalitarian schemes of intestacy that divided 
property among all children, or at least all male children, equally.163 
These propositions found their way into positive law. But Paine and Jef-
ferson went further. Viewing inheritance as a merely civil right, both 
men suggested that government could limit the ability of any man to in-
herit a vast fortune.164 For instance, Paine proposed a progressive inher-
itance tax that would limit the amount of wealth that could be inherited 
by any individual.165 Under  Paine’s  proposal,  the  marginal  tax  rates  rose  
to 100% on the largest estates, thereby prohibiting the inheritance of 
wealth beyond a certain predetermined point.166 Paine and Jefferson 
painted their proposals as breaking from the English traditions of monar-
chy and aristocracy. Rather, their proposals promoted freedom and 
equality of opportunity. It is easy to see why these arguments were fairly 
well received. They appealed to the American values most prevalent at 
the time. 
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C. Early Federal Death Taxes 
Early federal estate and inheritance taxes had little, if anything, to 
do with promoting any social policies related to inherited wealth. These 
taxes were enacted with the rather modest goal of generating needed 
revenue during times of war or crisis.167 The American experience with 
taxing property transfers taking place at death officially began with the 
Stamp Act of July 6, 1797.168 Despite its stated policy of neutrality, the 
United States was increasingly impacted by the unrest in Europe stem-
ming from the French Revolution, which had begun some years earli-
er.169 The various international tensions prompted Congress to improve 
and expand the American naval forces.170 To raise the necessary revenue 
for this naval development, Congress enacted a system of stamp duties, 
which included certain stamp duties relating to death and probate.171 
Specifically, the 1797 Stamp Act required the purchase and use of feder-
al stamps in connection with various estate-related legal documents such 
as inventories, receipts for legacies, probates of wills, and letters of ad-
ministration.172 Rates were fairly modest, and shares of the estate passing 
to surviving wives, children, or grandchildren were exempt.173 Eventual-
ly, the international tensions abated and with them the need for additional 
revenue. Congress repealed the 1797 Stamp Act in 1802.174  
Americans did not see this sort of federal tax again until the Civil 
War, some sixty years later. Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1862 in 
order to raise the additional funds necessitated by the Civil War.175 The 
Revenue Act of 1862 included a federal stamp tax on the probate of wills 
and letters of administration, much like the prior Stamp Act.176 However, 
the new tax imposed an inheritance tax on the receipt of personal proper-
ty rather than a stamp tax.177 Like most inheritance taxes, the 1862 tax 
consisted of graduated rates depending on the closeness in the familial 
relationship between the decedent and the recipient of the property.178 
Once again, the rates were fairly modest.179 Pursuant to the Revenue Act 
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of 1864, Congress increased the inheritance tax rates and included the 
transfer of real property within the scope of the inheritance tax.180 After 
the war, Congress quickly repealed these taxes.181 
Along with the Spanish–American War came the re-emergence of 
federal taxes on transfers of property at death. These taxes were still not 
aimed at preventing inherited wealth. Congress passed the War Revenue 
Act of 1898, again with the simple goal of financing a war.182 The 1898 
Act included a tax on the transfer of personal property at death.183 As 
with prior incarnations of federal transfer taxes, the 1898 tax exempted 
transfers to surviving spouses.184 Rates depended on both the size of the 
estate and the degree of familial relationship between the decedent and 
the beneficiary, resulting in a tax with characteristics of both an inher-
itance tax and an estate tax.185 Once again, Congress repealed the tax 
shortly after the end of the war.186 
These first few incarnations of federal inheritance taxes were pri-
marily, if not exclusively, motivated by the need for revenue.187 Alt-
hough the election to impose an inheritance tax rather than an estate tax 
could be indicative of some underlying social policy, it does not appear 
that much thought was given to any social policy at the time.188 Rather, 
the taxes quite simply existed to raise revenue in a manner that would not 
place any undue hardship on taxpayers. The taxes were relatively uncon-
troversial, and most people assumed that death taxes would only be used 
in times of exigency.189  
D. Rise of the Manufacturing Aristocracy and an Era of Change 
By  the  late  1800s,  America’s  economic  landscape  had  changed  sig-
nificantly.190 By that point, achievement and success—particularly secu-
lar occupational achievement and success—were thoroughly entrenched 
in the American value system.191 For the first time, however, Americans 
faced a conflict between those values and the equally fundamental value 
of equality of opportunity.192 Rejecting the economic and social restraints 
faced  in  Britain  and  Europe  “could  only  lead  under  the  historical  circum-
stances to the emergence of what [Tocqueville] called a manufacturing 
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aristocracy.”193 The era of the robber barons laid the groundwork for a 
major, unavoidable, and continuing tension between American values. 
The Industrial Revolution and the transforming economy changed 
the concentration of wealth in America in measurable ways by the late 
nineteenth century. Americans saw vast amounts of wealth become con-
centrated in the hands of a few industrialists.194 This   “manufacturing  
aristocracy”  presented  a  dilemma.  On  the  one  hand,  Americans  embraced  
the  “rags to riches”  stories  embodied  by  these  elite  few.195 As Williams 
observed,  “The  ‘success  story’  and  the  respect  accorded  to  the  self-made 
man  are  distinctly  American,   if  anything   is.”196 Therefore, the members 
of this manufacturing aristocracy embodied the upward mobility that was 
part of the promised American dream.197 Through hard work, anyone 
could achieve great success.  
On the other hand, the growing wealth inequities revived some of 
the concerns expressed by Jefferson and Paine regarding inherited 
wealth. Many Americans continued to believe that inherited wealth ran 
afoul of the principle of equality of opportunity because it gave some 
individuals a decided advantage due simply to parentage.198 The econom-
ics seemed to support the concern that the dangers of inherited wealth 
would be soon realized. By the late 1800s, wealth inequality reached a 
high point. In the period between 1774 and 1900, the concentration of the 
country’s  total  wealth  in  the  hands  of  the  richest  1% of Americans rose 
dramatically: from 15% in 1774; to 29% in 1860; to 50% by 1900.199 
Thus, by 1900, Americans saw great disparities between the richest 
Americans and the poorest—and even between the richest Americans 
and everyone else.  
Americans were conflicted. To many, the promise of America and 
capitalism was the potential for upward mobility. The industry barons of 
the era embodied this dream. But whether the descendants of these bar-
ons should inherit these vast fortunes was another story. The Jefferson 
and Paine position re-emerged, this time taking aim at the American 
manufacturing aristocrats. Jefferson and Paine argued against the evils of 
a political system that had enabled European and British aristocrats to 
maintain their power. That political system prevented non-aristocrats 
from participating in the government, economy, and society. Thus, the 
Jefferson–Paine argument seemed well founded at the time of the Revo-
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lution. To avoid exclusively aristocratic participation, America had to 
design a political system that would not enable an aristocracy. By the 
1900s,  Americans  saw  a  new  “aristocracy”  formed  on  their  own  soil,  and  
they used the same revolutionary-era arguments to advocate political 
changes aimed at suppressing it. But times had changed. 
The wealth disparity seen during the turn of the century had little, if 
anything, to do with inherited wealth. The rather extreme wealth dispari-
ties resulted from capitalism, industry, and the changing economic land-
scape of America. There is scant data to support the assertion that these 
numbers resulted from inherited wealth.200 Rather, this era  was  “witness  
to an unprecedented number of mergers in the manufacturing sector of 
the economy, fueled by the development of a new form of corporate 
ownership,  the  holding  company.”201 These  economic  changes  “resulted  
in the concentration of wealth in a relatively small number of powerful 
companies and . . . the  businessmen  who  headed  them.”202 An estate tax 
would not likely do anything to remedy this wealth-disparity problem.203 
Yet, progressives argued that an estate tax was essential to remedy the 
inequity.204 Proponents of the tax framed the issue in terms of core 
American values, and the public found that framing irresistible. 
One of the prominent voices in the growing movement to prevent 
inherited wealth was Andrew Carnegie. In his influential essay, Wealth, 
Carnegie   epitomized   the   country’s  uncomfortable  position  with   its   new  
economic landscape.205 On the one hand, Carnegie championed industry 
and wealth accumulation.  
The price which society pays for the law of competition, like the 
price it pays for cheap comforts and luxuries, is also great; but the 
advantages of this law are also greater still, for it is to this law that 
we owe our wonderful material development, which brings improved 
conditions in its train. . . . We accept and welcome, therefore, as con-
ditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of 
environment, the concentration of business, industrial and commer-
cial, in the hands of a few, and the law of competition between these, 
as being not only beneficial, but essential for the future progress of 
the race.206 
To Carnegie and others, lifetime wealth accumulation was their just 
reward   for   great   talent:   “That   this   talent   for   organization   and  manage-
ment is rare among men is proved by the fact that it invariably secures 
for its possessor enormous rewards, no matter where or under what laws 
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or   conditions.”207 On the other hand, with this great wealth and power, 
came a duty to dispose of that wealth in a manner that benefitted society 
as a whole. Those who benefitted most from living in America, like Car-
negie, owed the country the largest debt. To Carnegie, that did not mean 
leaving it to heirs who had done nothing to earn it.208 His sentiments ech-
oed those of Paine and Jefferson. Simply allowing a child to inherit the 
wealth would cause irreparable harm to society.  
Why should men leave great fortunes to their children? If this is done 
from affection, is it not misguided affection? Observation teaches 
that, generally speaking, it is not well for the children that they 
should be so burdened. Neither is it well for the state. Beyond provid-
ing for the wife and daughters moderate sources of income, and very 
moderate allowances indeed, if any, for the sons, men may well hesi-
tate, for it is no longer questionable that great sums bequeathed of-
tener work more for the injury than for the good of the recipients. 
Wise men will soon conclude that, for the best interests of the mem-
bers of their families and of the state, such bequests are an improper 
use of their means.209 
The movement against inherited wealth found other supporters.210 
However, it was still some time before the policy made its way into a 
serious political debate.  
E. Enactment  of  the  “Modern”  Estate  Tax 
By the turn of the century, America embarked upon the beginning 
of several decades of sweeping social and political change. The great 
disparity in the concentration of wealth in America and the resulting con-
flict in fundamental American values provided the political will to make 
these changes. Much like the recent “Occupy”  protestors,  late  nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century reformers sought a variety of changes aimed 
at evening the playing field. The various reform movements largely re-
flected  the  attempt  by  the  “little  man”  to  impose  some  limits  on  the  pow-
er   of   “big   business.”211 The little man asked the government to step in 
and ensure equality of opportunity. However, some perceived this as an 
assault on achievement, success, and individualism. Although changes 
were widely popular, opposition began to grow. 
Reformers sought to regulate corrupt corporations, eradicate the 
corrupting influences of alcohol and brothels, and break up large concen-
trations of wealth. Activists looked to the government as a mechanism 
for enforcing social change, rather than as an impediment to it. Congress 
established the Federal Trade Commission and passed the Clayton Anti-
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trust Act. In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act and the 
Meat Inspection Act. In 1911, the Supreme Court used the 1890 Sherman 
Antitrust Act to break up Standard Oil. In 1913, the Sixteenth Amend-
ment was ratified, allowing the federal government to impose an income 
tax.   These   economic   changes   had   a   meaningful   impact   on   America’s  
economic landscape.  
Against this backdrop of change, talk soon turned to using a federal 
tax in order to restrict inherited wealth. The proponents framed the ar-
gument in the same manner as did Paine and Jefferson, a frame that had 
wide popular appeal but was now inherently flawed. In 1906, President 
Theodore Roosevelt proposed  
the adoption of some such scheme as that of a progressive tax on all 
fortunes, beyond a certain amount, either given in life or devised or 
bequeathed upon death to any individual—a tax so framed as to put it 
out of the power of the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to 
hand on more than a certain amount to any one individual.212 
Echoing Jefferson and Paine, Roosevelt continued to promote a tax to 
regulate inheritances. In his 1907 State of the Union Address, Roosevelt 
again framed the tax in terms of equality of opportunity.  
The Government has the absolute right to decide as to the terms upon 
which a man shall receive a bequest or devise from another, and this 
point in the devolution of property is especially appropriate for the 
imposition of a tax. 
. . . A heavy progressive tax upon a very large fortune is in no way 
such a tax upon thrift or industry as a like would be on a small for-
tune. No advantage comes either to the country as a whole or to the 
individuals inheriting the money by permitting the transmission in 
their entirety of the enormous fortunes which would be affected by 
such a tax; and as an incident to its function of revenue raising, such 
a tax would help to preserve a measurable equality of opportunity for 
the people of the generations growing to manhood.213 
This equality of opportunity frame caught on. In 1912, the Progres-
sive   Party   announced:   “We   believe   in   a   graduated   inheritance   tax   as   a  
national means of equalizing the holders  of  property.”214 The issue, how-
ever, was not without controversy. The debate generally turned on 
whether inheritance taxes should be reserved to state governments.215 
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Opponents  of  the  federal  tax  argued  that  it  would  impede  the  states’  abil-
ity to raise much needed revenue.216 Congress twice rejected the imposi-
tion of a federal estate or inheritance tax: once in 1909 and again in 
1913.217 But by 1916, things had changed. 
Once again, America faced war. The First World War, and the 
events  surrounding  it,  naturally  caused  Americans’  value  focus  to  tempo-
rarily  shift.  President  Woodrow  Wilson  declared   that  “[t]he  world  must 
be  made   safe   for  democracy.”218 Making the world safe for democracy 
was an expensive proposition. Anticipating that, the Ways and Means 
Committee began investigating how best to raise additional revenue.219 
The  Committee  reported,  “No  civilized  nation . . . collects so large a part 
of its revenues through consumption taxes as does the United States, and 
it is conceded by all that such taxes bear most heavily upon those least 
able   to  pay   them.”220 Thus, the Committee recommended a progressive 
estate tax as one of several mechanisms to more fairly raise the needed 
money.221 Congress agreed and enacted the 1916 Revenue Act, which 
imposed a federal estate tax that is largely credited as being the first 
“permanent”  federal  estate  tax.222  
The 1916 tax shared many features with the current federal estate 
tax  and  is  often  referred  to  as  the  first  “modern”  estate  tax.  The  tax  was  
designed as an estate tax rather than an inheritance tax.223 As an estate 
tax,  the  1916  tax  was  assessed  based  on  the  value  of  the  decedent’s  estate 
as opposed to the value of any particular inheritance.224 Like the current 
estate tax, the value of the estate was increased for certain lifetime trans-
fers made in contemplation of death, not intended to take effect at death, 
or for inadequate consideration.225 After taking into account certain ex-
emptions for funeral expenses, administrative expenses, debts, losses, 
claims against the estate, and a general $50,000 exemption, the 1916 tax 
was levied at progressive rates ranging from 1% to 10%.226 
Some members of Congress might have been influenced by the 
popular equality of opportunity frame. However, the 1916 tax was not 
aimed at regulating inherited wealth. The primary reason Congress en-
acted the tax was the immediate need for additional revenue.227 In fact, 
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with a maximum rate of 10%, the tax could not impact inherited wealth 
in a meaningful way.228 Rates increased several times during the course 
of World War I, but each time was in response to an increased need for 
revenue.229 Some members of congress who voted in favor of increased 
rates may also have been looking to regulate inherited wealth, but that 
was not the overarching legislative intent.230 Nor was it the effect of the 
estate tax legislation.231 As World War I ended, legislators considered 
whether to repeal or reduce the federal estate tax.232 Before the 1916 tax, 
Americans largely assumed that an estate tax would only be used to raise 
the additional revenue needed in times of crisis.233 Although some politi-
cal groups had advocated using the tax to regulate inherited wealth,234 
most Americans probably never viewed that proposal as a serious possi-
bility. In fact, the modern federal tax system was still very much in its 
infancy. Congress was just beginning to fully explore its ability to regu-
late the states and their citizens through its taxing and spending powers.  
F. Andrew Mellon and the Framing of the Opposition 
When Congress reduced but did not repeal the 1916 tax at the con-
clusion of the war, some people began questioning the appropriateness of 
the tax, and the modern debate began in full. The tenor of this debate was 
different from prior debates. Wealth disparities remained high in the ear-
ly 1920s, and the idea of regulating inherited wealth retained popular 
appeal.235 If anything, the war had only made the members  of  the  “manu-
facturing   aristocracy”   even   richer.236 Thus, advocates of reform were 
anxious to retain the economic reforms attained during the war.237 In 
1924, Congress actually raised the top rate from 25% to 40%.238 Con-
gress additionally enacted a new gift tax to prevent evasion of estate tax 
through inter vivos gifts.239 Opponents of the tax were outraged. 
Treasury  Secretary  Andrew  Mellon  called  the  rate  increase  “nation-
al  suicide”240 and immediately embarked upon a very public campaign to 
repeal the tax in its entirety.241 The  estate  tax  was  not  Mellon’s  only  ob-
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jective. Congress soon repealed a number of the taxes enacted during the 
war, repeals which largely benefitted the wealthy.242 
Mellon  was  instrumental  in  framing  the  opposition’s  argument,  and  
that frame remains the prominent frame today. Mellon recognized that 
when a business owner died, his estate might consist largely of stock in 
the business.243 Forcing a sale of that stock in order to pay estate taxes 
would cause the value of the stock to drop. The problem was described 
as follows: 
[I]f the estate should consist of corporation shares, then 40 percent of 
those would have to be unloaded, perhaps on a market not at the time 
prepared to absorb them. There then might not merely be a loss to the 
heirs but also an unwarranted harm might be done the company in-
volved by having a large block of stock poured into a nonreceptive 
market. Other and quite innocent stockholders might find their hold-
ings depreciated in value merely because the government was getting 
out its death due.244 
Although   this   aspect   of  Mellon’s   argument   seems   plausible,   many   ex-
perts contend that it is fundamentally flawed from a legal standpoint245 
and unsupported by economic data.246 Mellon’s  conflict  of  interest  in  the  
matter  was  obvious.  Mellon’s  hatred  of estate and inheritance taxes part-
ly resulted from a rather unusual and widely publicized case involving 
the  death   of  Mellon’s   friend,  wealthy   industrialist  Henry  Clay  Frick.247 
The  administration  of  Frick’s  estate  was  incredibly  complicated  for  rea-
sons largely unrelated to the federal estate tax. Mellon believed that sell-
ing  assets  in  Frick’s  estate  in  order  to  pay  estate  taxes  unduly  flooded  the  
market with a supply in excess of demand.248 Mellon repeatedly pointed 
to this highly publicized case in support of his economic theory.249 How-
ever,   the   decline   in   value  of   the   assets   in  Frick’s   estate   after   his   death  
was more likely a result of a depressed national economy than an excess 
supply occasioned from a single estate.250  
Mellon was not alone in challenging the estate tax, but he did lead 
the charge. Mellon grasped the problem with the way proponents framed 
the issue.  
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The social necessity for breaking up large fortunes in this country 
does not exist. Very wisely our forefathers declined to implant in this 
country the principle of primogeniture under which the eldest son 
alone inherited and kept the properties intact. Under our American 
law, it is customary for estates to be divided equally among the chil-
dren; and in a few generations any single large fortune is split into 
many moderate inheritances. As a usual thing, the continuation of a 
single fortune through several generations has been proven to be im-
possible. It is an often quoted saying that “there are three generations 
from shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves.”251 
The  lasting  aspects  of  Mellon’s  opposition  are  those  framed  by  ref-
erence to core American values. Mellon argued that the tax would punish 
activity and work.252 It would destroy the value of the property Ameri-
cans worked so hard to earn.253 It was the enemy of the American dream. 
Casting his argument in terms of equality, Mellon argued: 
The theory upon which this country was founded is equality of op-
portunity. So long as a man uses his abilities within the bounds of the 
moral sense of the community, monetary success is not a crime, but 
on the contrary adds to the total wealth of the country and to an in-
crease in the standard of living as a whole.254 
Mellon was aided by the emerging criticisms of Marxism, painting 
it as antithetical to American thought, thus playing to our nationalism 
values.255 For instance, Mellon argued that with an inheritance tax of 
40%,  “it  would  then be only two or three generations until private own-
ership  of  property  would   cease   to   exist.”256 “Estate   taxes,   carried   to   an  
excess, in no way differ from the methods of the revolutionists in Rus-
sia.”257 
In the wake of the Great Depression, however, even Mellon capitu-
lated.258 The Depression reduced income tax revenues while also increas-
ing the need for revenue to finance new projects.259 Faced with that prob-
lem, Mellon himself advocated for an increase in the estate tax rate.260 
Although ultimately unsuccessful in repealing the estate tax, Mellon and 
his colleagues were successful in framing opposition to the tax in terms 
of core American values. 
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G. Subsequent Developments 
The federal estate tax underwent many changes in the following 
years. In anticipation of the Second World War, Congress raised estate 
taxes in order to finance military development.261 Congress raised rates 
again   after   America’s   entry   into   the   war in response to revenue de-
mands.262 Beginning in 1976, the tax underwent major revisions aimed at 
modernizing the assessment and collection of taxes.263 In the end, eco-
nomics   research   supported   Mellon’s   “shirt   sleeves   to   shirt   sleeves   in  
three  generations”  contention.264 But that economic reality was lost amid 
the political rhetoric of family farms and ensuring equality of opportuni-
ty. 
VI. REFRAMING THE ISSUE 
The current public federal estate tax debate remains relatively un-
changed. The men in your pop quiz, along with numerous other politi-
cians and public figures, are irresponsible in the way they perpetuate this 
debate.  Both  sides  of  the  argument  are  based  upon  “facts”  that  have  not  
existed in more than ninety years. Yet America faces the largest wealth 
gap it has seen since the 1920s.265 That fact will undoubtedly shape poli-
tics and political debate for the next several years. We know from history 
that  when   that   situation  occurs,   the   “result   has  been  a  political   realign-
ment that tilted power and policy at least modestly away from the rich 
and  big  business.”266  
The Progressive Era of the 1900s is a prime example of that phe-
nomenon. America moved from an agrarian society to a manufacturing 
society, and that change, not inherited wealth, fundamentally altered the 
distribution of wealth in this country. The changes in the American 
economy were not immediately accompanied by corresponding changes 
in law and policy. By the 1920s, the disparity in wealth reached record 
levels.267 When that disparity became the focus of popular discourse, the 
country was willing to support change.268 Legislation and policies enact-
ed during the Progressive Era fundamentally changed the relationship 
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between government and its citizens.269 This theme has repeated itself 
often in our history.270 
We are in the midst of that repeated theme again. Our economy no 
longer looks like it did in the 1900s or during the Revolution. But the 
concentration of wealth and its relationship to democracy remains a con-
cern for many Americans.271 Inherited wealth no longer plays a meaning-
ful role in that very legitimate concern. Revolutionary Americans justifi-
ably believed that inherited wealth prevented equal opportunity to partic-
ipate in government because it fostered an elite ruling class of aristo-
crats.272 Eradicating the institutions that had promoted that system was an 
important and meaningful decision. By the 1900s, inherited wealth, as 
Mellon pointed out, was not the problem. Wealth disparity was high, but 
inherited wealth was not the cause. As Tocqueville anticipated, equal 
access to participate in the economy without restraint led to the devel-
opment  of  a  “manufacturing  aristocracy.”  Although  aimed  at   redressing  
that problem, the federal estate tax was not responsible for the changes 
seen in following decades.  
A federal estate tax will not affect wealth inequities in the coming 
years. Money, and as a result political power, is again concentrated in the 
hands of a few.273 But our economy looks much different from what it 
looked   like   in  earlier  eras.  Today  our  “aristocrats”   look different. They 
are not the landed aristocracy or the manufacturing aristocracy of bygone 
eras.  Rather,  today’s  “aristocrat”  is  the  corporation  and  the  political  lob-
byist.274 Through lobbying efforts, super PACs,275 and the like, corpora-
tions have an incredible ability to affect politics and legislation, particu-
larly after the landmark Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion276 decision.277 The federal estate tax is ill suited to address those 
problems and it is certainly ill suited to affect how much wealth and, in 
turn, political power corporations hold. 
  
 269. See id. at 144–52. 
 270. See, e.g., id. at 120. 
 271. See, e.g., Trumbull, supra note 265. 
 272. See infra Part V. 
 273. See Trumbull, supra note 265.  
 274. See Paul Blumenthal, Citizens United Reform, Requiring Corporations to Disclose Politi-
cal Spending, Sought from SEC, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2012, 4:22 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/26/citizens-united-reform-corporations-political-spending-
sec_n_1380094.html. 
 275. Known  as   “independent   expenditure-only   committees,”   super  PACs  are   free  of  most   of  
the constraints of traditional political action committees (PACs). See Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, 
‘Super  PACs’  Alter  Campaign, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2010, at A01. Unlike traditional PACs, super 
PACs can raise funds from individuals, corporations, and other groups without legal limits. Id. Super 
PACs may not make contributions to or coordinate with candidate campaigns or political parties but 
may engage in unlimited political spending independently of the campaigns. Id. The groups must 
disclose the identity of their donors. Id. 
 276. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 277. See Blumenthal, supra note 274.  
File: Issue1_Carter_FINAL_ToDarby_021913 Created on: 2/19/2013 10:33:00 PM Last Printed: 2/19/2013 10:33:00 PM 
210 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1 
That does not mean the estate tax is irrelevant. Many public figures 
and politicians will continue to debate the estate tax in the context of 
wealth disparity and will continue to utilize the same flawed frames of 
the  past  and   they  will  base   their   frames   in   “facts”   that  no   longer   exist.  
Perpetuating the flawed issue framing of the past century is irresponsible 
and destructive because it prevents us from considering the real opportu-
nities afforded by the tax. If properly reframed by both sides of the de-
bate, the estate tax debate could be productive. In the aftermath of war 
and economic collapse, America is again in the throes of a financial cri-
sis. The public is at odds as to how or if the government should raise 
additional revenue. The federal estate tax, if properly reframed, could 
play a meaningful role in that debate. 
As Americans, we value efficiency and practicality.278 In practice, 
that   means   “seeking   the   fastest   and   least   costly   means   of   achieving   a  
goal.”279 Efficiency and practicality are not always at the top of our per-
sonal or collective value hierarchies—but in the context of budget deci-
sions, they are values that probably should be. Where do we find the 
revenue needed to address current government needs? A fast, inexpen-
sive, and effective solution seems ideal.280 When facing the need for ex-
tra revenue in times of war or financial crisis in our early years, we as a 
nation turned to federal estate and inheritance taxes.281 These taxes were 
fairly modest and applied to a wide array of estates.282 They were not 
intended to cause social change283 and they did not seem to unduly bur-
den taxpayers. They were effective and practical. These taxes repeatedly 
provided a revenue safety net. Perhaps for those reasons, they were ini-
tially uncontroversial. By helping to finance, among other exigencies, the 
Civil War, World War I, the New Deal, and World War II, the taxes un-
doubtedly helped America accomplish meaningful and important change. 
But the taxes themselves were not the instrument of that change. They 
were merely a practical and efficient mechanism for financing that 
change.  
Not until politicians reframed the estate tax debate as a struggle be-
tween two compelling and irreconcilable American values—values on 
which the estate tax really had no bearing—did the tax become contro-
versial. By moving from a tax whose primary goal was to raise revenue 
to a tax aimed at battling income inequality by curbing the accumulation 
of wealth across generations, we made the tax itself so controversial and 
divisive that using it to raise revenue proved challenging. And yet, the 
tax did not, and perhaps could not, ever achieve its redistributive and 
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regulatory goals of wealth distribution. Nor did the tax cause the litany of 
harms alleged by its opponents. Our politics were so shaped by argu-
ments that were improperly framed at the outset that we kept missing the 
real potential of the federal estate tax. Rather than considering how best 
to use the tax to raise revenue in a manner that is efficient, administrable, 
and equitable, the debate centered on issues that are not meaningfully 
impacted by the tax. The federal estate tax currently provides a small, but 
meaningful, portion of federal revenue. Not only could the tax continue 
to do so, but if we reframe the debate in proper terms, we could rational-
ly consider using it to provide an even greater—and much needed—
source of revenue in the future. 
